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In August of 1996, the United States Congress passed the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA, Public Law 104-193).l 
Dismantling the 60-year-old federal cash assistance program, Aid to Families 
With Dependent Children (AFDC), this legislation replaced AFDC with Tempo-
rary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)—block grants to states governed 
under a new set of time-limits and restrictions. Although popularly known as 
"welfare reform" the PRA instead radically transformed the character of public 
assistance. Welfare was no longer a social safety net but a temporary program 
designed to encourage marriage and other "family values" among the nation's 
poor and to move welfare recipients as quickly as possible into the workforce. 
Along with a five-year lifetime limit on cash benefits and new work requirements, 
the PRA implemented strict restrictions on welfare eligibility, banning large 
sectors of the American public (including teenage mothers, newborn babies, 
convicted felons, and legal immigrants) from receiving public assistance. 
The political discourse that fueled welfare reform reveals much about how 
a neoliberal vision of the global economy shaped the connection between 
changing ideas about what kinds of people are deserving of state protection and 
American entitlements and the broader context of the triumph of the neoliberal 
vision of the global economy based on the ascendancy of free markets and the 
diminution of state social responsibility. As in the past, the contemporary welfare 
debate pitted the interests of a white citizenry against the de-legitimized claims 
of an undeserving and "alien" underclass. Welfare reform hinged on the belief 
that welfare and the culture it bred—not poverty—most harmed the poor. While 
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this idea is as old as social welfare itself, in "post-civil rights" America such 
stigmatization, by capitalizing on growing public resentment against low-income 
black and Latino immigrant women, was enough to dismantle the national 
welfare system. Indeed, welfare reform sent a stark message to those receiving 
welfare. By marking who would have and be denied access to benefits of 
citizenship, welfare reform was a form of civic disfranchisement that had long 
roots in the racialized politics of U.S. entitlements. 
Notwithstanding the historical continuities, the passage of the PRA signals 
a series of significant breaks from the past. For the first time since the creation of 
a nationalized system of social welfare in 1935, state and local governments have 
the power to design their own welfare eligibility standards and to deny assistance 
to those families who fall outside these narrowed eligibility definitions or fail to 
conform to along litany of behavioral codes. Moreover, while the AFDC program 
was designed to keep white women who had been widowed or abandoned at home 
with their children and out of the workforce, the "work-first" approach mandated 
by the federal government requires welfare recipients, the vast majority of whom 
are women, to accept any job, regardless of pay, work conditions, and childcare 
considerations. Those recipients who cannot secure paid employment are placed 
in community-service or "workfare" assignments, where they perform work in 
the public sector in order to receive their monthly welfare stipends. However, 
workfare assignments do not have to be new public jobs, and there are neither 
requirements for job training or higher education in the PRA nor do workfare 
workers have access to the labor protections of other workers. Thus, despite 
evidence of a shortage of jobs with living wages for recipients to get out of 
poverty, the legislation accepted the labor market as is: welfare recipients were 
the ones needing fixing, not the economy.2 
In its broadest sense, the passage of welfare reform in 1996 heralds the 
success of a "post-civil rights" consensus in American politics, that proclaims that 
race no longer determines individual success or failure, and that the government 
should only help those who help themselves. The emerging consensus among 
liberal politicians, scholars, and journalists around the cultural nature of welfare 
reflected a confidence that the nation had moved past its own history of 
denigrating the "cultures" of non-white people. It was now racist not to talk about 
the "dysfunction within" the black and Latino communities, and few felt the need 
to scrutinize the way that contemporary images of welfare recipients called up 
age-old stereotypes of black and Latina women as lazy, irresponsible, and 
promiscuous. With his set of black friends and his New South political back-
ground, Bill Clinton was well-situated to usher in a post-welfare world that played 
on racial imagery and ensured a racially bifurcated work force while disavowing 
that race had anything to do with it. The lexicon of post-civil rights America— 
"culture of poverty," "underclass," "family values"—pathologized non-white 
womanhood without speaking it.3 
The "work-first" provisions of the PRA also mark an historic shift in the 
relationship between social welfare and labor. Whereas the AFDC program was 
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part of a New Deal package that sought to protect the economic rights of white 
working-class men (by preventing low-wage feminized labor from undercutting 
prevailing union wages), the new TANF program degrades the power of orga-
nized labor and undermines recent gains by service sector unions such as the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU). The PR A forces a mass popula-
tion of under-educated female workers into the bottom half of a U.S. labor market 
that has, over the past three decades, been characterized by falling wages, flexible 
labor arrangements, and weakening worker rights and protections.4 The labor 
market benefits of welfare reform are enhanced because states are not required to 
keep records on what happens to recipients once they leave the welfare rolls. 
Thus, there are few safeguards to protect individuals as states seek to reduce their 
rolls by any means available. 
Equally significant is welfare reform's intervention in the arena of U.S. 
immigration policy. The PRA served as a "back door" to immigration reform as 
it widened the legal gap between citizens and legal immigrants, created immi-
grant categories entirely new to U.S. law, and opened up new channels of 
surveillance and information sharing between federal and local social service 
agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Riding on the 
political momentum of California's Proposition 187, the 1994 ballot initiative 
that barred undocumented immigrants from most social services,5 welfare reform 
signals the emergence of a contemporary anti-immigrant agenda that differs 
markedly from other periods of nativism in U.S. history. This shift represents new 
immigrants from Latin America and Asia not so much as threats to the work force, 
as in previous decades, but increasingly as threats to the American civic and fiscal 
community.6 Yet, while this "new nativism" deploys a racial-nationalist dis-
course, it ultimately furthers a neoliberal agenda in which the state serves the 
interests of global capital by ensuring the availability and vulnerability of an 
increasingly foreign-born and female work force in the United States.7 
Propelling welfare reform, then, were economic and political imperatives 
introduced by globalization. The dismantling of the U.S. social welfare system 
provides us with an analytical lens through which to examine the role of the 
nation-state in the late-twentieth-century global economy. On the one hand, the 
PRA represents an attempt to tighten the reigns of state authority and to reassert 
U.S. national sovereignty in the face of global integration. As the second most 
significant piece of legislation passed under the Clinton presidency, following the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994—at a time when Ford 
cars and Sears clothing are manufactured in maquiladora factories in Third 
World "free trade zones," when the most popular radio station in Los Angeles is 
broadcast in Spanish, and when the gospel of free trade is continually used to 
undermine the power of workers around the world—welfare reform offered 
American voters ostensible insulation against the tide of globalization. Vilified 
as an affront to American values of family, individualism, and self-reliance, black 
and Latina "welfare mothers" confirmed the voting public's sense of American-
ness precisely by serving as its antithesis.8 
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At the same time, although framed by a moralistic discussion of the psycho-
social benefits of work and "self-reliance," the actual rewards of the PRA were 
to be found in the global economic benefits of an enlarged low-wage work force. 
As it pushes low-skilled workers into a deregulated economic arena, welfare 
reform serves the interests of an increasingly transnational and flexible capitalism 
by removing government cash assistance (long seen by its critics as an impedi-
ment to the "free market") as a viable alternative or supplement to low-wage 
employment. By mandating that people work in any job for any wage, welfare 
reform ensured a low-wage work force vulnerable to the demands of global 
capital. Functioning in many ways as a domestic version of an IMF Structural 
Adjustment Program, the PRA imposed certain punitive restrictions on welfare 
recipients from which other Americans were exempt9 under a similar rationale 
that this would lead the way for greater opportunity and responsibility. 
Welfare reform, like California's Proposition 187, followed from the neoliberal 
logic of NAFTA—removing the national fetters on work and trade while erecting 
higher boundaries to entitlement and state protection.10 Like NAFTA and Propo-
sition 187, welfare reform re-territorializes the U.S. nation-state, dislodging the 
national economy from a bounded territory and creating an imagined (and 
increasingly corporatized) public sphere that reserves its rights and privileges for 
a white, middle-class citizenry.11 Supporters sold both NAFTA and the PRA 
through the neoliberal logic of free trade—arguing that lifting trade restrictions 
and social subsides would elevate all workers. Yet, the economic effects of both 
policies have hardly been elevating for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. 
Indeed, the PRA provides a telling window on the centrality of race within the 
ideologies fueling globalization: by playing on faulty assumptions about the 
cultures and values of people of color, such ideologies legitimate economic 
policies that maintain, if not exacerbate, racial hierachies. 
The Racialization of Welfare: 
From "Deserving Mothers" to "Welfare Queens" 
AFDC had its roots in the mother's pensions programs instituted by 
most states in the 1910s and 1920s. These programs sought to reinforce 
women's domestic role and keep mothers out of the workplace by giving 
"deserving mothers" a small subsidy. "Deserving mothers" were largely 
defined as white mothers, and these programs were instituted to protect 
white married or widowed women. In 1935, realizing the need of average 
Americans for a modicum of protection from the unstable nature of the 
market, Congress passed the Social Security Act, creating five new pro-
grams to provide a safety net for Americans if they were to come on hard 
times: unemployment compensation, old-age insurance, Aid to the Blind, 
Old Age Assistance, and Aid to Dependent Children. According to the act, 
ADC benefits were "designed to release from the wage earning role the 
person whose natural function is to give her children the physical and 
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affectionate guardianship necessary."12 Because many of the New Deal's 
programs were administered through the states, and because, particularly in 
the South, white politicians feared losing black women's cheap domestic 
and agricultural labor, black women were largely deemed ineligible for 
ADC benefits, disqualified during the cotton harvesting season, or intimi-
dated from even applying.13 "Suitable home" provisions found in the stat-
ute were often enforced on a racial basis; case workers often disqualifying 
black children if their mothers did apply.14 Thus, states have vied for 
power to determine welfare eligibility criteria throughout the century, and 
such criteria have long rested on the interests of keeping women of color 
in the low-wage workforce.15 
ADC was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children in 
1950, providing benefits to the custodial parent (mother) to stay home and 
raise her children. Consistent with postwar American family ideals, 
throughout the 1950s and early-1960s women receiving welfare were 
required to stay home. Yet, the ideology of female domesticity as mani-
fested in welfare policy continued to be racially biased as employment 
rates for black and Latina mothers climbed steadily in the post-1945 pe-
riod.16 In the late-1960s, growing activism in communities of color, par-
ticularly the formation of the National Welfare Rights Organization 
(NWRO) in 1967, led to change in the welfare system. Community activ-
ists pushed to open AFDC to all those who met means-tested standards 
and lobbied to increase benefits to ensure that they met poor families' « 
basic needs. Framing welfare as a right and a matter of equality, the 
NWRO took its message to the streets, into welfare offices, in front of 
state legislatures, and before the courts on behalf of the rights of poor 
women. By 1969, its membership reached 25,000, with thousands more 
participating in NWRO-sponsored events. As Johnnie Tillmon, the first 
chairwoman of the NWRO and a black recipient herself, argued, 
There are a lot of other lies that male society tells about 
welfare mothers: that AFDC mothers are immoral, that 
AFDC mothers are lazy, misuse their welfare checks, 
spend it all on booze and are stupid and incompetent. If 
people are willing to believe these lies, it's partly because 
they're just special versions of the lies that society tells 
about all women.17 
Civil rights lawyers and NWRO activists challenged these stereotypes 
as they successfully fought to overturn "man in the house" rules, establish 
a right to a fair hearing to maintain or obtain welfare benefits, and ensure 
enforcement of little-known provisions in welfare regulations outlining 
minimum standards for people on welfare.18 The NWRO's organizing ef-
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forts, along with President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, opened 
welfare to those eligible, including women of color; eligible families re-
ceiving AFDC jumped from 33 percent in 1960 to over 90 percent by 
1971. At the same time, increasing numbers of families faced extreme 
poverty in the 1960s, particularly as a result of the mechanization of 
southern agriculture and the beginnings of de-industrialization in the North. 
By 1974, 10.8 million people were receiving AFDC, up from 3.1 million 
in 1961.19 
Despite evidence that the expansion of AFDC and food stamp benefits 
did succeed in significantly reducing hunger and malnutrition in America,20 
the backlash against the gains of the civil rights movement, including those 
regarding AFDC, began in earnest with the election of Richard Nixon.21 
While AFDC had never been a very popular program, the frontal attack on 
welfare began when larger numbers of women of color began receiving the 
benefits to which they were entitled under law. Nixon and, more success-
fully, Ronald Reagan channeled the increasing economic vulnerability of 
middle- and working-class Americans into a racially-charged campaign 
against "government largess" and public entitlement.22 Reaganomics blamed 
income maintenance programs not only for weakening "capital's ability to 
depress wages by means of economic insecurity," but for producing 
"overly secure" workers who are less likely to acquiesce to onerous work-
ing conditions.23 
Tapping into the white conservatism fomented by Nixon's "Silent 
Majority" campaign, Reagan's war on welfare flourished through a strategy 
of racial division and homilies about hard work and family values. The 
president and his administration accused the "liberal" programs of the 
1960s, and their black and Latina clients, of undermining the American 
tradition of individualism and self-reliance. AFDC s shortcomings went 
beyond its fiscal cost to honest, hard-working (read "white") American 
taxpayers. In his 1986 State of the Union address, Reagan openly blamed 
the AFDC system for propagating a "welfare culture" of "female and child 
poverty, child abandonment, horrible crimes, and deteriorating schools."24 
Drawing on a centuries-old culturalist discourse on poverty, Reagan tar-
geted the "welfare state" and its undeserving clientele as the primary cause 
for America's social and economic problems. 
Reagan's message enjoyed great appeal among white middle- and-
working-class voters who were faced with an economic crisis that shook 
the foundations of U.S. society. Beginning in the early-1970s, private di-
vestment from manufacturing centers in the East and Midwest, coupled 
with the expansion of a low-wage service sector and light industry in the 
Sunbelt, profoundly transformed the U.S. labor market. In the 1970s, pri-
vate divestment and capital flight cost over 38 million manufacturing jobs. 
Between 1979 and 1984, the poverty rate rose from 11.7 percent to 14.4 
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percent—a dramatic 23 percent increase.25 The changing character of work 
began to erode public confidence in the Fordist promise of unrestrained 
economic growth and a rising national standard of living. The shift from 
manufacturing to service and high-tech information industries, and the 
deployment of just-in-time production techniques, made it easier for em-
ployers to replace full-time employment with part-time and temporary jobs, 
and to "substitute lower-paid female labour for that of more highly paid 
and less easily laid-off core male workers."26 As job security and worker 
protections shrank alongside federal regulation of corporate activity in the 
1980s, the domestic "Leave It To Beaver" family ideal of the 1950s had 
been replaced by the reality of two-working-parent households struggling 
to make ends meet. Simultaneously, as both real wages and publicly-sub-
sidized childcare shrank, the number of female-headed households living in 
poverty rose sharply. Between 1970 and 1978, the number of poor single 
mothers and their children grew by 38 percent. In 1983, women accounted 
for two-thirds of all poor adults in the United States.27 
By the mid-1980s the effects of economic restructuring and 
globalization could be seen most profoundly in the altered class structure 
and racial landscape of U.S. cities. The transformation of manufacturing 
centers like New York and Chicago into global "command centers" for 
high finance, tourism, and technology produced what economists describe 
as an "hourglass economy," sharply divided between high-income and low-
income workers.28 "Reindustrialization" in southwest cities like Los Angeles 
and Houston replaced unionized jobs in rubber and automobile manufactur-
ing with sweatshop production in the growing garment and electronics 
industries. As white working- and middle-class families fled the city for 
federally subsidized suburbs, the economic elite that remained cloistered 
itself in fortress-like condominiums and gated residential communities ser-
viced by a brown and black brigade of janitors, maids, gardeners, and 
nannies. 
That the emergent class structure of American cities was bifurcated 
along racial lines can be explained by several factors. First, "last hired, 
first fired" rules disproportionately affected African American and U.S.-
born Latino workers who, as a result of the anti-discrimination policies of 
the 1960s, had only recently gained entry into the skilled trades, and were 
also geographically concentrated in urban centers hit hard by corporate 
downsizing, factory shutdowns, and municipal cutbacks. In New York 
City, where manufacturing declined at three times the national rate, 40 
percent of the city's Puerto Rican workers were unemployed by the mid-
1980s. Also displaced from unionized blue-collar work, black workers 
were increasingly concentrated in low-wage clerical and service occupa-
tions in the private and public sectors (the latter which would be devas-
tated by the city's "fiscal restructuring" in the early-1990s, which cost 
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25,000 public jobs, including 15,000 layoffs).29 With similar patterns in 
cities across the nation, by 1985, the black unemployment rate had risen 
to a crisis level of 15.1 percent, followed by Latino unemployment at 10.5 
percent.30 
Second, following passage of the 1965 immigration reforms,31 immi-
gration from Latin America and Asia radically transformed U.S. urban 
centers. In three decades, the percentage of Europeans among legal immi-
grants dropped from 80 percent to less than 20 percent, with the majority 
of new immigrants settling in coastal métropoles like New York, Miami, 
and Los Angeles.32 This wave of post-1965 immigration coincided with the 
economic changes described above. On the one hand, the migration of 
highly educated Asian and South American professionals and venture capi-
talists (referred to as the Third World "brain-drain" of the 1970s and 
1980s) contributed to the growth of the "informational city,"33 and to the 
development of transnational economic linkages between the United States 
and newly industrializing nations. More significant, in sheer numbers, was 
the arrival of millions of working-class immigrants from Mexico, the 
Caribbean, and Southeast Asia, displaced by industrialization and multina-
tional development in their homelands and drawn to U.S. cities by jobs in 
the growing service and light manufacturing sectors. In Los Angeles, for 
example, the Latino population grew by 71 percent between 1970 and 
1980, with Mexican and Central American immigrant workers concentrated 
in producer services or export-competitive production—industries character-
ized by low wages, low unionization rates, and unstable employment. By 
1980, 61 percent of male workers and 66 percent of female workers in 
Los Angeles were employed in part-time, part-year jobs. Moreover, be-
tween 1967 and 1982, real average wages for L.A.'s unskilled workers 
(both native-born and immigrant) dropped by 8 percent.34 Thus, while the 
city's Mexican immigrants were "instrumental in the ^industrialization of 
certain low-wage industries,"35 the vast majority of Mexican workers and 
their children lived in racially segregated, high poverty barrios. In Los 
Angeles, as in other U.S. métropoles, post-Fordist capitalism flourished 
from the availability of low-wage immigrant labor, producing an urban 
political economy sharply divided along lines of class, race, and nativity. 
In the face of the changing economic realities of an increasingly global 
economy, President Reagan and his New Right allies capitalized on the city as a 
valuable political commodity. Throughout the 1980s, and continuing into the 
1990s, media coverage and political discourse on "urban decline"—of rising 
crime rates, vicious youth gangs, crack cocaine, illegal aliens, teenage welfare 
queens, and absent fathers—constructed an image of the city, and its brown and 
black residents, as a world apart and different from the rest of America. Centuries-
old racist and nativist beliefs intertwined in this portrait of a "Third World inside 
a First," of ghettos and barrios as incubators for alien cultural values, hyper-
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sexual and criminal behavior, broken marriages, and overly large families. 
Indeed, the genius of Reagan's strategy lay in its ability to link this portrait of a 
foreign and dangerous city to the "cultural struggle over the material and 
symbolic conditions of U.S. citizenship."36 If, as Lauren Berlant has argued, "the 
anti-federal but patriotic nationalism of Reagan Republicanism [worked] to 
shrink the state while intensifying identification with the Utopian, symbolic 
'nation,'"37 then the city in the 1980s became the dystopian mirror to Reagan's 
Americanism. Calling on "ordinary citizens" to reclaim the nation from liberals, 
minority interest groups, and urban criminals, Reagan offered American voters 
a new private vision of the public sphere: a nation embodied in the cloistered 
enclave of family and privatized community life. 
Reagan's fetishization of privacy and individualism, however, did not 
extend to poor women and people of color, whose behavior and family life came 
under intensified surveillance and scrutiny during the 1980s. Painting welfare 
recipients alternately as threats to the national community and as victims of 
government policy, Reagan moved to eradicate the welfare state "for the good of 
the poor." Calling for a return to the American tradition of self-help and voluntary 
associations,38 Reagan abolished the public service jobs program, cut almost half 
a million people from the food stamp program, and reduced or eliminated funds 
for public housing and Medicaid for the working poor. Moreover, Reagan, and his 
successors George Bush and Bill Clinton, put work requirements into AFDC and 
encouraged state governors to seek waivers from federal guidelines. By 1996, 
over 40 states had applied for waivers and were running welfare-to-work 
demonstration programs that eventually laid the groundwork for the federal 
TANF program.39 
Revealing the new role of the American state in the global economy, 
Reagan' s anti-government ideology did not aim to do away with government but 
to shift its role. Eliminating the fetters in the market through cuts in social 
spending coincided with tremendous increases in law enforcement and military 
spending. In 1981, Reagan persuaded Congress to allocate a $ 1.2 trillion increase 
in military spending over five years. Reagan's War on Drugs gave the federal 
government new jurisdiction over crime, and in 1982, Reagan and Congress 
authorized $ 125 million to hire a thousand new FBI and DEA agents. Federal drug 
prosecutions skyrocketed, nearly 100 percent from 1982-1988, far ahead of any 
actual increase in drug crimes. In 1986 and again in 1988, the administration and 
Congress passed a series of harsh mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines, 
interjecting the "get tough" voice of the state into the arena of sentencing.40 
The Welfare Debate in the 1990s: 
Forging a "Post-Civil Rights" Consensus 
While most critics of welfare reform blame the Reagan Revolution for the 
recent dismantling of AFDC, few consider how academic social science in the 
1980s and 1990s, even among scholars who called themselves liberals, legiti-
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mized Reagan's behaviorist analysis of poverty. Ken Auletta's The Underclass 
(1982) first popularized the concept of a behaviorally defined "underclass" as an 
alien sub-population that menaced the nation and thus was at fault for its troubled 
position in society. But it was the publication of William Julius Wilson's The 
Truly Disadvantaged in 1987 that gave the liberal imprimateur for Democratic 
governor and presidential hopeful Bill Clinton to call for "an end to welfare as we 
know it." 
Wilson took older conservative ideas about poverty, married them to a 
structural analysis, and recast them as liberal formulations on the underclass. He 
explicitly connected this new underclass to changes in the U.S. economy (notably 
deindustrialization and public and corporate disinvestment from U.S. cities) that 
improved the incomes of many blacks while leaving the rest of the black 
community unemployed, poor, and increasingly isolated. These structural changes 
in the economy, according to Wilson, precipitated behavioral and community 
change in black inner-city neighborhoods. As basic institutions declined, the 
social organization of inner-city neighborhoods—sense of community, positive 
neighborhood identification, and explicit norms and sanctions against aberrant 
behavior—likewise declined. This process magnified the effect of living in 
highly concentrated urban poverty areas, effects that are manifested in ghetto-
specific culture and behavior.41 
According to Wilson, social dislocation and isolation were the defining traits 
of the underclass, the problems of poor blacks stemming from class rather than 
race.42 The dissolution of the black community43 and of black families as men lost 
their jobs led to the creation of a permanent underclass whose "behavior contrasts 
sharply with that of mainstream America."44 Wilson was particularly concerned 
with the proliferation of single-parent families and teenage pregnancy, even 
while citing statistics that show that fertility rates for black teenagers have 
actually decreased since 1970. While Wilson took pains to distinguish his 
analysis from conservatives like Charles Murray by emphasizing the structural 
roots of black community decline, his focus on "the tangle of pathology in the 
inner city"45 legitimated the belief that a profoundly destructive culture had 
emerged in the nation's inner cities. Comparing liberal structuralists (like 
Wilson) to neo-conservatives (like Murray), historian Robin Kelley has con-
cluded that "For all their differences, there is general agreement that a common-
debased culture is what defines the 'underclass,' what makes it a threat to the 
future of America."46 
By the early-1990s, Wilson's theoretical formulations had overtaken Ameri-
can social science, forging what Stephanie Coontz calls the "new consensus" that 
weak family ties and values explains postwar black poverty.47 Wilson's gendering 
of urban problems—his fixation on absent fathers and overly-sexual mothers— 
lent academic credence to conservative political arguments not only by locating 
the causes of black poverty in black culture (a theme already well-developed in 
the 1960s and 1970s), but also by explicitly establishing a causal link between 
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black social pathology, rapid urban decline, and rising public expenditures. 
Moreover, his portrayal of an inner city populated by poor blacks and Latinos 
forsaken by their more successful, middle-class brothers and sisters helped unite 
the stigmatization of Latino immigrants and blacks in both conservative and 
liberal discourse throughout the 1980s and 90s.48 Journalist after journalist, 
scholar after scholar, went to the "other America" to show how different this 
world was from the rest of America.49 Teenage mothers, deadbeat dads, gang 
members—the fictionalized inhabitants of Wilson's post-industrial city—be-
came the stars in a public morality play about the struggle between true 
Americanism and an exotic, dangerous "underclass." 
Underclass theory thus proved an ideal vehicle for the anti-immigration 
cause, allowing groups like the Federation for American Immigration Reform 
(FAIR) to appeal to taxpayer antipathy towards big government as they blamed 
immigration for the explosion of the urban underclass. Beginning in the 1980s 
and gaining momentum in the early 1990s, growing public outcry against illegal 
Mexican immigration, the increased visibility of nonwhite and poor immigrants 
across U.S. cities, hospitals, public schools, and social service agencies, and a 
media frenzy over Latino and Southeast Asian youth gangs all worked together 
to associate immigration, welfare, and "urban problems" in public debate. 
Though immigrants were denounced for a long litany of social and economic 
problems—from taking American jobs and depressing wages, to pollution and 
overpopulation, to causing the cultural "disuniting" of America—public con-
cerns focused prominently on the moral character of new immigrants and their 
dependency on welfare. 
In particular, long-standing stereotypes about Latina sexuality and fertility 
resonated throughout the contemporary debate over the 1996 reforms, as propo-
nents assumed that all immigrants on welfare were Latinos and that all Latinos 
(over 70 percent of whom are U.S.-born) are immigrants. Within the racialized 
discourse of welfare reform, Latinos were "alien" not by virtue of their national 
origins, but rather because, like blacks, they possess a culture that is antithetical 
to the American way of life. Always already cast as newcomers and cultural 
outsiders, poor Latinos fit ideally into the culturalist-behaviorialist discourse at 
the heart of underclass theory. Concentrated in urban centers (and often in or near 
historically black neighborhoods), Latino immigrants and their U.S.-born chil-
dren melded well with the social ecological focus of underclass discourse, 
confirming the link between urban decay and the moral decay of urban dwellers. 
This linking of blacks and immigrants in public discourse, as well as in 
federal law, marks a unique characteristic of late-twentieth-century U.S. politics. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants had served as a discursive foil to African-
Americans. Celebrated as exemplars of American values of family and hard 
work, second-generation European immigrants' assimilation into the suburban 
middle class (and later, the emergence of Asian-Americans as "model minori-
ties") proved that with the "right" cultural values all ethnic groups could succeed 
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in U.S. society.50 This framing of immigrant success, then, had obscured continu-
ing racial discrimination by locating the causes for racial and class inequality in 
the cultural defects of African Americans. 
Having celebrated immigrant success as proof that the system works, 
slashing immigrant welfare entitlements in 1996 was only possible through the 
particular racialization of post-1965 immigrants. Implicit—and explicit—in 
nativist calls for restricting immigration and denying public benefits to nonciti-
zens was a belief that Latino and Asian immigrants were racially unassimilable 
to the Anglo-Saxon (white) core of American society. In his 1995 Alien Nation 
Peter Brimelow, senior editor at Forbes Magazine and the National Review, 
described new immigrants as "poor, ignorant desperate people" fleeing from 
"primate cities" like Mexico City, Cairo, or Calcutta.51 Proclaiming that "race and 
ethnicity are destiny in American politics," Brimelow warned that "immigration 
is breaking the racial hegemony of white Americans" as unskilled Third World 
immigrants are "swelling in the ranks of the welfare underclass."52 Chicago 
Tribune writer Géorgie Anne Geyer blamed immigrants for undermining the 
American tenets of self-government and citizenship and contributing to the decay 
of public life. Contrasting Latino and Asian immigrants to a nostalgic (and 
historically inaccurate) portrait of previous European immigrants, Geyer con-
cluded that new immigrants "lack the inclination to assimilate" and are pulled to 
the United States by economic need and government hand-outs, rather than by a 
"patriotic love" for their new home country.53 
While journalists such as Brimelow and Geyer lumped together all new 
immigrants into one menacing "racial other," more moderate conservatives and 
liberals advanced similar views by drawing on an ideology of individualism that 
drew distinctions between "good" and "bad" immigrants. Good immigrants were 
those who learned English, became U.S. citizens, and never took government 
handouts. Bad immigrants included illegal aliens, criminals, bilingual speakers, 
and welfare recipients. Immigrants who had "made it" without governmental help 
were proof that hard work and personal responsibility would lead to success.54 
This moral typology resonated with the model of meritocracy so central to the 
"post-civil rights era," and worked to reinforce ethnic and class divides within the 
immigrant population and the nation as a whole. At the same time, the racial 
codewords and symbols embedded in public discourse concerning immigration 
provided white native-born Americans a lens for understanding Americanism in 
an increasingly global world. 
This cultural vocabulary for immigration signals the emergence of what 
Etienne Balibar has identified as a "new racism without races... whose dominant 
theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differ-
ences."55 Once race was recast as "culture," and culture was equated with social 
and class position, proponents of welfare reform could advocate eliminating 
public entitlements for undeserving foreigners, while continuing to celebrate the 
United States as a country of immigration and "individual opportunity." Just as 
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the current generation of urban blacks was denounced for abandoning the cultural 
and moral traditions of the old African American community, so immigrant 
newcomers were represented as culturally different from the hardworking and 
humble European immigrants of previous generations. Public discourse on the 
welfare underclass invoked a mythic history of black and immigrant life in the 
early-twentieth century as proof of contemporary urban decline. This distorted 
past was then used to condemn contemporary blacks and immigrants for their lack 
of values, motivation, and responsibility. 
The effectiveness of this new discourse on immigration was evidenced in the 
liberal response to the debate, as immigrant advocates and scholars insisted that 
immigrants had the same cultural values (hard work, family, religion) as Ameri-
cans—or at least that some immigrants had better values than others. Scholarly 
critiques of the Asian American "model minority" thesis, for instance, nonethe-
less reinforced the moral distinction between the welfare poor and the working 
poor, noting that Asian immigrants worked longer hours than native-born 
Americans and relied less on public assistance. Similarly, scholarly and popular 
portraits of Latin American immigrants emphasized their high rates of labor 
participation and marriage, contrasting these new arrivals to blacks. Thus, while 
such writings strove to distinguish immigrants from the underclass, they ulti-
mately left the cultural and moral assumptions of underclass theory intact.56 
Cultural definitions of immigrant poverty surfaced differently in the work of 
sociologists like Min Zhou and Alejandro Portes, who turned to "segmented 
assimilation" theory to explain growing economic and social inequalities be-
tween different immigrant groups, and across immigrant generations.57 Inverting 
the logic of assimilation theory, these scholars credit the economic success of 
certain immigrant groups in U.S. society, such as Cubans and Punjabi Sikhs, to 
the maintenance of tight-knit ethnic communities and the retention of "traditional 
values" from their countries of origin, such as belief in hard work, sacrifice, and 
family unity. In contrast, other immigrant groups, like Mexicans and Haitians, 
have assimilated into an "inner-city minority culture" that is characterized by "an 
adversarial stance towards the white mainstream" and a self-defeating cynicism 
about the possibility of upward social mobility.58 By embracing black "urban 
culture"—which Portes and Zhou identify with rap music, hip-hop dress, and 
defiance towards school officials—the U.S.-born children of Mexican and 
Haitian immigrants place limits on their own educational and economic mobility. 
In this theoretical paradigm, race is a self-destructive choice for new immigrants, 
a cultural costume they can put on or take off at will. Echoing the logic of 
underclass theory, which conflates class, race, and behavior, the literature on 
"segmented assimilation" lent credence to the idea that it is the cultural values of 
poor people that create economic and social inequality. 
What moved the debates concerning the underclass was the insistence that 
racism no longer mattered. Echoing Wilson's postulation that racial discrimina-
tion was not primarily responsible for post-1960s black poverty, proponents of 
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welfare reform declared that the United States had moved beyond its history of 
racism and now the problems of immigrant and native-born people of color had 
to do with their own values. The success of welfare reform lay in politicians' 
abilities to foreground the problems with welfare recipients of color while 
denying that gendered assumptions or racism had anything to do with their 
intentions. As President Clinton explained, "It's not racist for whites to assert that 
the culture of welfare dependency, out-of-wedlock pregnancy and absent father-
hood cannot be broken by social programs, unless there is first more personal 
responsibility."59 Indeed, when polled, nearly 60 percent of white Americans 
answered that they believed that blacks on welfare "could get along if they tried" 
and that if "blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as 
whites."60 
By locating racism in the past, supporters of "welfare reform" re-formed the 
age-old stereotypes of blacks and Latinos into a more polite language of 
"underclass," "inner city," or "welfare recipient." Tellingly, in one New York 
Times/CBS News poll, two-thirds of Americans said there was too little assis-
tance for the poor. But when asked about welfare and those who receive it, only 
23 percent said that the assistance was too little.61 The racial histories behind these 
assumptions were palpable: welfare recipients were lazy; welfare recipients had 
too many babies and too little work ethic; without proper control, welfare 
recipients cheat the system and squander their benefits.62 But the cleverness of 
welfare reform was making the moral crisis of welfare dependency seem so new, 
so urgent, and so post-racial as to avoid the historical parallels. 
Also crucial to the success of welfare reform was the addition of prominent 
African American and Latino voices who supported "reform"—what Mike Davis 
has called the "blacklash."63 Thus, this focus on culture was legitimated by the 
voices of certain black and Latino academics and public figures whose self-help 
philosophies called on blacks and Latinos to redeem themselves and their own 
community.64 In the 1980s and 1990s, many blacks and Latinos embraced the idea 
of personal responsibility as a means to community empowerment. However, as 
this concept was co-opted by national debates around welfare, it came to represent 
a system where taxpayers and governments were no longer responsible. Real 
change would come only when individuals and their own communities assumed 
more personal responsibility. 
By the mid-1990s, the national debate over "personal responsibility" focused 
exclusively on the black and immigrant welfare poor—this in spite of the federal 
government's own statistics showing that poor whites made up the majority of the 
nation's welfare recipients.65 Although blacks and Latinos were not the numerical 
majority of welfare recipients, each of these two communities was disproportion-
ately poor. In 1996, 28.4 percent of blacks and 29.4 percent of Latinos lived in 
poverty, more than double the poverty rate for whites.66 Yet, national consensus 
agreed that the problem was not poverty, but rather the black and Latino poor 
themselves. Television coverage, newspaper articles, and political speeches 
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blamed blacks and immigrants for their own poverty, repeating over and over 
again that blacks and immigrants were the reason that welfare did not work. 
Although families on welfare were slightly smaller than the average U.S. family 
and less than 9 percent of immigrant households received cash public assistance,67 
public discourse continued to promote the idea that blacks were making careers 
of having babies just to collect a larger welfare check and that immigrants with 
their overly large families were crossing the border only to cash in on American 
entitlements. While the immigrant population that used public assistance was an 
extremely diverse sampling of immigrants from Europe, Asia, and Latin America, 
public images centered around Mexicans and Puerto Ricans (although Puerto 
Ricans are citizens not immigrants).68 
Similarly, media stories highlighted the substandard work ethic among 
blacks and Latinos, who allegedly preferred sitting around waiting for their next 
check instead of looking for a job. In reality, three-quarters of welfare recipients 
did not remain long on welfare but moved from welfare to under-paid work with 
great frequency.69 In their comparative study of welfare recipients and single 
mothers in low-wage jobs, Katherine Edin and Laura Lein found that the 
economic gap between working women and women on welfare (most of whom 
were also working) was insignificant. Based on their actual incomes and their 
labor market opportunities, work was not a route out of poverty for either group 
of women.70 Edin and Lein's ethnographic findings are confirmed by national 
data that show that work in the 1990s often did not lift a family out of poverty. 
While a full-time, minimum-wage worker with two children in the 1970s lived 
above the poverty line, the same family today makes $8,840 a year—far below 
the 1995 poverty line of $12,188.71 For many parents in minimum-wage jobs, 
public assistance had become a necessary means to supplement what they were 
denied in the private sector: an income they could survive on and health benefits 
for their family. 
Despite numerous studies that show that welfare recipients are a heteroge-
neous group of Americans, from diverse racial backgrounds, family types, work 
histories, and lifestyles, the debate over welfare reform in the 1990s had moved 
so far to the political right that it was dominated by racial and nationalistic 
symbols that had once been the purview of neoconservatives like Pat Buchanan 
and the Christian Right. New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who 
criticized the bill, still described inner-city life in eugenic terms: "[I]f you were 
a biologist, you could find yourself talking about speciation here."72 Rather than 
describe a government program that kept women and children barely above the 
poverty line, but had succeeded in combating widespread hunger in many 
communities, "welfare" had become a codeword for race and the linchpin in a 
national debate over American culture and citizenship.73 With public responsibil-
ity to the poor now seen as dangerously naïve, the task at hand was to find the most 
efficient way of removing these families from the welfare rolls. And Bill Clinton, 
a neoliberal politician with a coterie of black friends and advisors who would use 
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the oldest of racial stereotypes to demonize welfare recipients, a man who would 
condemn the morals of others while asking the nation for forgiveness for his own 
shortcomings, was the ideal man to bring this all together. 
The "End of Welfare as We Know It": 
An Overview of the PRA 
United in a crusade to rescue American individualism from the clutches of 
the welfare system, Democrats and Republicans together fashioned the most 
draconian dismantling of social welfare in the history of the United States. In 
many respects, the new welfare system created in 1996 operates through the kind 
of tautological logic that characterizes symbolic politics. Rather than respond to 
the real demographics of poverty—an inadequate labor market, a lack of 
childcare and health benefits, urban divestment from social services and poor 
communities—the authors of welfare reform were more concerned with impos-
ing moral values and slashing welfare numbers and drew upon a collection of two-
dimensional caricatures of women on welfare to shape the legislation.74 Thus, 
despite its "work-first" sloganeering, the PRA was not designed to move 
recipients from poverty into long-term, meaningful employment. 
In reality, TANF is not so much a welfare program as it is a funding stream 
that distributes block grants to states and oversees a minimum set of federal 
regulations on work and family life. States have total flexibility in spending 
federal money, but in order to maintain their grant levels, they must reduce their 
welfare rolls by at least 50 percent by the year 2000. To facilitate these 
implementation goals, federal rules established a five-year lifetime limit on cash 
benefits, and stipulated that at least 80 percent of each state's welfare recipients 
must be working a minimum number of hours within two years. Welfare clients 
who cannot find a job are given a choice of losing all of their benefits or working 
in the public sector in exchange for a monthly welfare stipend ("Workfare"). 
Notably, federal work requirements operate from an "any job is better than 
welfare" philosophy. States are not required to provide basic education or skills 
development to their welfare clients, or to track employment outcomes and wages 
through time. Workfare participants are not protected under minimum wage 
provisions or national fair labor standards. 
Certainly, one of the most sinister aspects of workfare is the use of welfare 
recipients to replace unionized workers.75 Workfare jobs did not have to be newly 
created jobs and thus have often been contracted-out old jobs. Using the divide-
and-conquer strategy that companies used against unions throughout the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, workfare sought to undermine the successes 
unions had been gaining in the service sector by forcing them to compete with a 
grossly under-paid, coerced workforce of welfare recipients. This was not the 
outcome that the architects of the PRA put forth. The assumptions behind the 
work-first provisions of the PRA—like those of low-paid immigrant work more 
broadly—were that these welfare recipients would take the jobs that no one else 
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wanted. Reformers played on the racial antagonism of (imagined white) workers 
toward (imagined colored) welfare recipients to distract workers from the 
economic ramifications of the changes and to prevent any alliances between 
recipients and workers.76 
However, workfare in practice not only ensured the public and private 
sectors of an available, cheap, new workforce, but it also threatened to drive down 
wages and force more Americans into poverty. In essence, workfare takes its cues 
from post-Fordist capitalism: replacing full-time salaried workers with part-time 
below-minimum-wage employees. In New York City, for example, Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani has cut 22,000 municipal workers since 1995 and replaced 
them largely with workfare workers. Part-time workfare workers now make up 
three-fourths of the labor force in the Parks Department and one-third of the 
Sanitation Department. They also help staff the city's welfare agency, housing 
authority, and public hospitals. The fiscal advantage to the city is clear: the 
average New York city clerical worker's hourly wage is $12.32, not including 
benefits, but a workfare worker costs the city $1.80 an hour for a 20-hour work 
week and earns no benefits.77 
Welfare reform has also meant big profits for Wall Street. Under generous 
tax breaks implemented by the Clinton administration, private employers who 
hire former welfare recipients can deduct up to 50 percent of their employees' 
wages from their taxes.78 Meanwhile, as the march towards the privatization of 
government services speeds up in the welfare arena, large corporations are 
aggressively vying for more than $20 billion in federal and state grants to run 
welfare-to-work services. Maximus, the nation's largest company specializing in 
welfare work, boasts an annual revenue of $127 million and over 1,600 employ-
ees nationwide who have taken over the duties of traditional caseworkers in the 
public sector.79 Public support of the poor, then, has been replaced with public 
support of corporations. Welfare reform brought with it real economic benefits— 
for corporations and municipal governments—but increased economic vulner-
ability for working people. 
Alongside this attack on workers' rights, almost two-thirds of the 1996 
welfare law was a litany of rules and sanctions on family and sexual life designed 
to regulate morality on a population deemed naturally immoral and deviant. 
Already familiar with a punitive system that tracks their personal behavior, 
TANF participants must now navigate an even more complicated system of rules 
and penalties: welfare recipients will not receive benefits for any additional 
children born after August of 1996; mothers under the age of eighteen must be 
living with an adult and enrolled in school, or they lose all benefits; parents 
convicted of fraud or drug possession (no matter which drug or what quantity) 
face a lifetime ban on benefits; families who move to a higher benefit state are 
subject to the lower benefit levels of their home state; and parents who fail to 
immunize their children or send them to school will lose some or all of their cash 
benefits. 
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The Personal Responsibility Act also served as a covert means for immigra-
tion reform, as Title IV drew even sharper distinctions between the rights and 
entitlements of citizens and non-citizens. Whereas, under the old system, a 
greencard gave one access to public benefits, legal immigrants who arrive in the 
United States after August of 1996 must wait for five years before applying for 
cash assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, and public housing. Moreover, under the 
new "deeming" rules of the PRA, the income and resources of an immigrant 
applying for welfare will be deemed to include the income and resources of the 
immigrant's spouse and of the immigrant's sponsor, making it increasingly 
difficult for legal immigrants to qualify for means-tested public assistance.80 
Perhaps the most publicized immigrant regulation was the federal ban on food 
stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for most legal immigrants, 
regardless of age or length of stay in the United States. On August 22,1996, over 
one million legal immigrants became ineligible for food stamps, and half a 
million elderly and disabled immigrants became ineligible for SSI assistance.81 
Only certain refugees and asylees, veterans and their families, and legal immi-
grants who could provide proof of 40 quarters (10 years) of work in the United 
States were exempt from the cut-offs. While the work documentation require-
ment would be hard for any citizen to meet, it was nearly impossible for an 
immigrant population concentrated in informal and seasonal employment. 
A less publicized feature of welfare reform was its frontal attack on illegal 
immigration. Under AFDC, undocumented immigrants were not eligible for 
public assistance, but their U.S.-born children were. While this distinction 
remains in place, state agencies who receive federal funding (including the 
Housing Department and other social service agencies) are "required on request 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to furnish the INS with the name 
and address of, and any other identifying information about, any individual who 
the [agency] knows is unlawfully in the United States."82 This reporting require-
ment is accompanied by a new system of information sharing between public 
service agencies and the INS. Previously prohibited by federal law, welfare 
caseworkers can now directly contact immigration agents for information about 
their clients. Today, an undocumented mother who applies for public assistance 
for her U.S.-born child risks the threat, not only of deportation, but also of having 
to repay any public benefits that were improperly received (whether or not there 
is proven intent to deceive).83 The implications of these new rules for undocu-
mented immigrants move far beyond the sphere of the welfare system, transform-
ing every public service agency into an arm of the INS. Alongside beefed-up 
enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border, and new immigration rules that facilitate 
the deportation process, the denial of due process enacted by welfare reform 
clearly widens the divide that separates undocumented families from the civil 
rights that protect the rest of the American public. 
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Welfare's Missing in Action: 
Assessing the Aftermath of the PRA 
No sooner had President Clinton signed the PRA into law, than Republicans 
and Democrats were jostling for airtime, eager to take credit for ending a morally 
corrupt entitlement system. Celebrants of welfare reform, from members of 
Congress to state governors to the mainstream press, rushed to publish statistics 
and rosy human interest stories of dropping welfare numbers as evidence of 
success of "ending welfare as we knew it."84 Between 1993 and 1997,85 Clinton's 
Council of Economic Advisors reported almost three million recipients had fallen 
off the rolls, a 20 percent drop nationwide.86 By the summer of 1999, Clinton 
would once again declare welfare reform a success, citing new evidence that 35 
percent of all welfare recipients had moved into work, or "work-related activities. "87 
As with much of the public debate that enshrouded welfare reform, these 
statistics were largely tautological. Few stopped to question the most obvious 
explanation for these dropping numbers: poor families were leaving the welfare 
rolls because they were being pushed off welfare. Beginning in the mid-1980s, 
and culminating with the passage of the PRA, more and more states had been 
carving away at cash and food stamp assistance, making it easier for caseworkers 
to terminate clients' benefits, and imposing strict work requirements and behav-
ioral rules. Even before the federal overhaul in 1996, over half of the nation's 
recipients were covered by state welfare rules that, were it not for the waiver 
program implemented by the Reagan administration in 1986, would have violated 
federal law. Following the passage of the PRA, as states rushed to secure federal 
block grants by reducing their welfare rolls, welfare review boards found that as 
much as 50 percent of the cases under review, where recipients had lost some or 
all of their benefits, were the result of erroneous state action.88 
Nor did celebratory media portraits of "heroic working mothers" tell the 
whole story of welfare reform.89 Lost in public debate was any meaningful 
analysis of what types of jobs the 35 percent of welfare recipients had obtained, 
or of what would happen to the remaining 65 percent of poor mothers and children 
once the safety net was removed. While ordering the Congressional Budget 
Office to track declining welfare rates, Clinton cynically refused to keep a 
concurrent count of welfare reform's effects on child poverty rates, despite 
independent estimates that 1.1 million children would be forced into poverty 
under TANF.90 Dropping welfare costs—not the economic and social welfare 
of low-income families—had become the nation's litmus test for effective 
public policy. 
As welfare reform enters its fourth year, however, recent national data reveal 
alarming implications for low-income families. On the same day that President 
Clinton celebrated the success of the PRA in the summer of 1999, the Urban 
Institute released a study that showed that "near one-third of those that had left 
public assistance since August of 1996 had returned at least once, and that one 
fourth of those who had left welfare are not working and have no working 
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partner."91 The study also found that health insurance, which had formerly been 
provided to recipients through the Medicaid program, had been severely im-
pacted by the 1996 reforms. A small minority, 23 percent, of those who had 
moved from welfare-to-work reported receiving health insurance through their 
employment—nearly 50 percent below the national average of all workers— 
leaving the majority without health coverage.92 As was true before the 1996 
legislation and remains the case today, work does not necessarily provide the road 
out of poverty for many Americans. Data collected in August of 1998 contradicts 
Republican Bill Archer's conclusion that "welfare recipients' lives are getting 
better, poverty is going down, and more Americans are enjoying the freedom of 
independence from the chains of welfare." In its nationwide survey of wages 
earned by former welfare recipients who had moved into work, the Congressional 
General Accounting Office found that mean hourly wages fell between $5.60 and 
$6.60 (a full-time job at $5.50/hour falls far below the poverty line of $13,650/ 
year for a family of three) ,93 Moreover, one 1999 study of former recipients who 
are employed found that most do not have full-time, year-round jobs. Thus, their 
annual earnings average between $8,000 and $9,500.94 
Such alarming figures have been dismissed by welfare reform supporters 
who argue that the "New Economy" will miraculously absorb this massive new 
workforce. Bombarded with rosy statistics about record-low unemployment 
levels and booming job creation, the public has regained confidence in the 
American promise of unrestrained national economic growth (even if this does 
not actually reflect their own family's experiences in the labor market). The 
economic optimism of the late-1990s has bolstered public support for the 
dismantling of social welfare. The presumption that anyone who wants to work 
can get a job means that it is no longer seen as cruel for the government to push 
single mothers, poor children, and legal immigrants off public assistance. 
Despite record-low national unemployment levels, however, research shows 
that welfare recipients applying for employment continue to face stiff competi-
tion, even for poverty-wage jobs. A 1997 study of what kinds of jobs would be 
available to low-skilled welfare recipients in the Midwest, for example, found 
that "there are twenty-two workers for each job that pays at least a poverty wage; 
sixty-four workers for every job that pays 150 percent of poverty ($ 18,417/year); 
and ninety-seven workers for each job at a living wage ($25,907/year for a family 
of three)."95 Similarly, Katherine Newman's survey of fast food restaurants in 
New York's Harlem concluded that for every minimum-wage job, there are 
fourteen applicants. According to Newman, "Statewide estimates of the gap 
between the number of people who need jobs (the unemployed plus the welfare 
recipients) and the number of available jobs in New York approach one mil-
lion."96 It is not surprising, then, that between 1996 and 1998 only one-fifth to one-
third of New York's adult welfare recipients had found work.97 Indeed, there is 
evidence that the PRA has increased competition at the bottom end of the labor 
market, further depressing wages paid to low-skilled workers.98 Thus, even in 
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regions with significant job growth, rising employment rates have paradoxically 
been accompanied by rising poverty rates and growing class polarization. Out of 
the 300,000 new jobs created in Los Angeles County between 1993 and 1999, for 
example, the vast majority pay less than $25,000 a year, and barely one in ten 
averages above $60,000. Los Angeles' transformation into a polarized economy 
is further evidenced in the fact the region's economic recovery has "yielded no 
net jobs in industries that pay solid middle-class salaries ""These figures are 
reflected in similar studies of other urban centers which confirm that job creation 
in the United States is concentrated in the lower end of industries that specialize 
in poverty wages and flexible labor arrangements. 10° The fastest growing job into 
the twenty-first century, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, will be 
cashiers.101 Thus, the "economic miracle" of the New Economy, in fact, does not 
look like much of a miracle but more of a crisis from the vantage point of low-
income families. What seems clear from the evidence thus far is that the PRA has 
succeeded in moving some recipients off welfare and into work, some recipients 
off welfare but not into work, and very few off welfare and out of poverty. 
Conclusion: A Post-National, Post-Racial World? 
Despite these alarming prognostics, American journalists as well as 
readers, politicians as well as voters, continue myopically to applaud the 
drop in AFDC numbers by turning away from a broader analysis of the 
nature of work and poverty in the global economy. As recent studies of 
welfare reform suggest, job growth and rising employment rates are not 
reliable indicators of poverty reduction in this post-Fordist U.S. economy. 
Rather, poverty is today a product of work for those American workers at 
the bottom of the socio-economic structure, as it is for the majority of 
workers around the world. The trends we see in the United States—the 
erosion of wages, benefits, and working conditions, the incorporation of 
greater numbers of women, racial minorities, and immigrants into the low-
wage workforce, and widening class divisions—are magnified at the global 
level as multinationals migrate freely and continuously across national 
borders in search of bigger profits.102 
Welfare reform, like NAFTA, followed from the logic of global free 
trade: open the market, get rid of the artificial barriers and subsidies, and 
all will have the chance to prosper. Yet, neither the PRA or NAFTA 
dismantle the barriers to economic and racial equality so much as recast 
globalization through a mix of neoclassical economics ' and American ide-
ologies of moral individualism and bootstrap opportunism. Thus, while 
supporters of NAFTA proposed "to bridge the racial and cultural borders 
that divide the Americas," and to "empower" Mexican workers by creating 
the conditions of a First World economy, NAFTA in fact has not im-
proved the wage basis of Mexican workers, as Manning and Butera point 
at in their article in this issue.103 Similarly, proponents of the PRA eel-
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ebrated American ideals of opportunity and responsibility,104 while expand-
ing a feminized and racialized workforce stripped of the labor protections, 
benefits, or even minimum-wage guarantees granted to other U.S. workers. 
The effect of these policies on both sides of the border is greater economic 
and social instability, as more than a million and a half Mexican workers 
lost their jobs,105 and as millions of poor women and their children in the 
United States race against the welfare clock in search of a sustainable 
livelihood. 
Calling attention to the expansive reach of multinational corporations, 
and the increased mobility of people and commodities across national 
borders, critics across the political spectrum have charged that 
globalization has resulted in the decline of the power of the nation-state.106 
However, while framed through an anti-government discourse, neoliberal 
policies such as welfare reform do not reduce government, so much as 
reshape it. As the social state is "downsized" through the elimination and 
privatization of social services, schools, prisons, and transportation, the 
positive public benefits that were once the hallmark of U.S. citizenship are 
increasingly accessible only to those who can afford them. At the same 
time, as states replace schools with prisons, cities rush to grow their police 
forces, and the Border Patrol doubles in size, the punitive arm of the state 
extends its surveillance over the nation's poor. The result is a federal 
government that actively facilitates the flexibility of capital by forcing 
millions of workers into a deregulated labor market, while it erects higher 
barriers to full citizenship in the national community. That contemporary 
efforts to circumscribe the benefits of citizenship continue to posit people 
of color, both immigrant and U.S.-born, as national outsiders further sug-
gests that the symbolic power of white Americanism has not suffered 
under globalization. 
In this newly privatized civil society, where U.S. citizens-qua-consum-
ers are presumably "empowered" to choose their schools as well as their 
racial identities, those individuals who freely make the wrong choices 
deserve to be contained, punished, or "rehabilitated." The individualization 
of free choice bolsters the ideology of meritocracy at the heart of post-
1960s American politics by locating choice in the private, psychological 
terrain of the "self," and thus obscuring the ways in which choices are 
themselves structured and limited in a political economy of racism, patri-
archy, and capitalism. The tautological nature of this ideology is evident in 
the equation of good and bad choices with class and racial position. In 
post-civil rights America, the nation can call upon welfare recipients to 
achieve "self-sufficiency" in a labor market that lacks adequate wages, safe 
childcare, decent medical coverage, and affordable housing, and, in the 
same breath, blame the continued marginalization of black and Latina 
workers on their self-defeating attitudes, cultural defects, and unfortunate 
"lifestyle" decisions. The ideology of "choice" ultimately rests on 
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racialized and gendered ideas about what kinds of work and remuneration 
different kinds of people deserve, while simultaneously ensuring that those 
on the losing end of the globalization equation are made "responsible" for 
their own failure and subjection. 
Notes 
In an academic world that too often isolates scholars and forgets that scholarship 
is a shared enterprise, writing this paper together was a vivid testament to the 
intellectual gift collaboration can be. We would also like to thank Scott Dexter and 
Jason Elias for their political vision, steadfast patience, and logistical and theoreti-
cal help that enriched this paper and our writing process tremendously. 
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